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This paper explores first-day returns on infrastructure entity initial public offerings
(IPOs) in Australia from 1996 to 2007. While a good deal has been written on the
first-day returns of industrial and mining company IPOs and Real Estate
Investment Trust IPOs, first-day returns of infrastructure entity IPOs have yet to
be reported in the literature. The study uses ordinary least squares regression
analysis to identify factors that might influence the percentage first-day returns
theoretically available to investing subscribers and factors that might influence the
aggregate amount of money left to subscribers by issuers. The study finds that
first-day returns, on average, are not significantly different from zero. There is
evidence, however, that suggests higher dividend yields and higher percentage
direct costs of capital raising influence these first-day returns. The study also finds
that infrastructure entity IPOs that seek to raise more equity capital leave less
money on the table for subscribing investors.
Keywords: infrastructure funds; IPOs; underpricing
1 Introduction
There is a great deal of literature on the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs).
Underpricing is also commonly referred to as a ‘first-day return’. The terms are often
used to describe the percentage return made by investors subscribing to IPOs and then
being able to sell the shares at a price higher than the issue, or subscription price, on
the first day of listing. Substantial first-day returns, on average, have been docu-
mented across the world in regard to industrial company IPOs (see, for example,
Ritter, 2003). In addition, the literature on the underpricing of Real Estate Investment
Trust (REIT) IPOs continues to grow with US studies by Wang, Chan and Gau (1992)
reporting a 2.82% overpricing, to Ling and Ryngaert (1997) reporting a 3.60% under-
pricing, to, more recently, Chen and Lu (2006) reporting 3.2% underpricing. As for
Australian REITs, Dimovski and Brooks (2006) report a 2.6% return, while Kutsuna,
Dimovski and Brooks (2008) report a 0.51% first-day return to subscribers of Japa-
nese REIT IPOs.
The literature on the underpricing of infrastructure entity IPOs, however, is not
substantial, nor is it clear in regard to first-day returns. There are two key research
questions that this paper seeks to address. The first is to determine the statistical
significance of the magnitude of first-day returns available to investing subscribers on
*Email: wd@deakin.edu.au
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average, and the second is to investigate factors that potentially influence these first-
day returns to provide deeper insight to issuers, underwriters and investors. This study
reports the first-day returns on infrastructure entity IPOs in Australia from February
1996 to December 2007. The study also investigates factors such as the size of the
capital raising, the direct costs of the capital raising, whether the issue is underwritten,
the forecast dividend yield for the next forthcoming year, the time it takes for the
entity to list and the general stock market sentiment during the IPO, that might influ-
ence underpricing returns. Over A$10.5 billion of public equity capital was subscribed
to 30 infrastructure entity IPOs in Australia during 1997 to 2007. It is a substantial
sector by comparison with the largest Australian industrial and mining IPO sectors
reported in Dimovski and Brooks (2004), who identify A$1.3 billion raised by 53 gold
mining IPOs during 1994 to 1999, A$0.8 billion by 25 healthcare and biotechnology
IPOs during the same period and larger than the A$10.3 billion raised by 26 telecom-
munications IPOs (including the A$8.57 billion Australian Government Telstra IPO)
during the same period. The amount raised is even larger than the A$9.9 billion that
Dimovski and Brooks (2006) report raised by 58 Australian REIT IPOs during 1994
to 2004. Despite the relatively large amounts of IPO capital raised by the infrastruc-
ture entity sector, the sector has not yet been systematically analysed in regard to first-
day returns.
Peng and Newell (2007) suggest that infrastructure investments provide useful
income returns and diversification benefits. As such it appears that large superannua-
tion funds are keen to increase their investment in infrastructure. Nielson (2005) fore-
casts that infrastructure investment accounted for approximately 2% (A$8 billion) of
total superannuation fund assets but that by 2012 this would increase to approxi-
mately 5% (A$65 billion). Some of the major listed infrastructure funds included
Transurban Group, capitalised at over A$6 billion, and were involved in the develop-
ment and management of electronic toll roads, owning most of the toll roads in
Sydney and Melbourne, Australia with its major shareholder, Canadian Pension
Funds, showing significant interest in taking over Transurban; Macquarie Airports
Group, capitalised at over A$5 billion and one of the world’s largest private airport
owners, owning airports in Sydney, Copenhagen and Brussels; Asciano Group, capi-
talised at around $4.5 billion, dominant in the port and stevedoring industry and a
substantial player in the rail industry with significant long-term contracts with
Australian mining companies including Macarthur Coal; APA Group, formerly
Australian Pipeline Trust, the nation’s largest natural gas infrastructure business
owning and/or operating 10,000 kilometres of distribution assets (estimated at around
A$8 billion) which provides enormous barriers to entry for potential competitors.
Peng and Newell (2007) summarise some of the investment characteristics of
infrastructure investments by suggesting monopoly attributes, high operating margins,
predictable earnings and cash flows due to regulation and/or long-term contracts, long
asset lives and high probability of distributions. Given these characteristics and Beatty
and Ritter’s (1986) argument that lower uncertainty about the future cash flows of an
IPO (and hence its valuation) reducing the ‘need’ for underpricing, one would not
expect the infrastructure entity IPOs to be substantially underpriced. However, given
the theoretical explanations for the need for underpricing on average, by new issuers,
by Baron (1982), Rock (1986), Tinic (1988) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989), one
would expect infrastructure IPOs on average to be statistically significantly
underpriced. It is worth noting that in early Australian Real Estate Investment Trust
(A-REIT) IPO literature Dimovski and Brooks (2006) report an average 1.2%
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underpricing return (but not statistically significantly different to zero return) on 37
A-REIT IPOs during 1994 to 1999. In later work, Dimovski (2010) investigated the
undepricing returns of Australian A-REIT IPOs from January 2002 to June 2008
(following the introduction of the Managed Investments Act 1998, which removed the
separate roles of manager and trustee, and allowed only for a single responsible entity
role) speculating that the post-2000 A-REIT IPOs may have more valuation uncer-
tainty than those prior to 2000. The mean underpricing return for the 2002 to 2008 A-
REIT IPOs was 3.37% and statistically significantly different to zero.
This study also investigates the amount of ‘money left on the table’ by the pre-IPO
owners. Money left on the table is defined as the number of issued shares multiplied
by the difference between the issue price and the closing price on the first day of
listing, and is an aggregate amount foregone by the pre-IPO owners (Loughran &
Ritter, 2004).
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises some of the liter-
ature in the area. In section 3 we present the model for first-day returns made by the
subscribers and the model for money left on the table by the pre-issue owners. Section
4 reports our empirical results. In Section 5 we make some concluding comments.
2 Previous work
The following section is divided into three subsections. The first reviews some expla-
nations for the underpricing of IPOs in general, the second subsection reviews infra-
structure literature both in Australia and internationally, and the third identifies some
of the infrastructure IPO literature.
2.1 Explanations for underpricing
Baron (1982) argued that underwriters took advantage of their superior knowledge of
the market for the new issuer’s shares and that the issuer would allow the underwriter
to underprice so as to raise the required equity capital. Tinic (1988) followed and
suggested that underwriters and new issuers allowed underpricing to reduce the possi-
bility of lawsuits from unhappy subscribers. Tinic (1988) also reports that underpric-
ing was significantly higher after the introduction of the US Securities Act of 1933,
which increased investors’ legal rights to take action against underwriters and IPO
issuers.
Rock (1986) introduced the ‘winner’s curse’ explanation for underpricing. He
argued that some investors have superior knowledge of the pre-listing value of some
IPOs. These investors he termed as being ‘well informed’ investors who tend to buy
underpriced new issues but are much less likely to buy overpriced issues. The ‘less
informed’ investors are therefore likely to receive a higher proportion of overpriced
issues and hence suffer a winner’s curse. Rock (1986) suggested, therefore, that only
by having new issues that are, on average underpriced, would IPOs continue to get
less-informed investors subscribing.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argued that underpric-
ing is used to induce regular investors. They suggested that IPOs were not on average
underpriced, and that investors would withhold their demand and buy shares after
listing.
Ruud (1993) suggested that underwriters engage in price stabilisation activities in
the aftermarket. Asquith, Jones and Kiesnick (1998) support Ruud’s (1993) finding
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and suggest that underwriters use price stabilisation activities to better market the
issue to both client investors and client IPOs. In Australia, however, legislation
prohibits the underwriter from price stabilisation activities.
Except for Ruud’s (1993) paper, all of the other explanations allude to the idea that
uncertainty, offer price and underpricing are related. Beatty and Ritter (1986),
however, argued more formally and empirically that lower uncertainty about an IPO’s
future cash flows and hence its valuation suggests lower underpricing is necessary.
Since that paper, researchers have found underpricing has been lower in larger IPO
issues (Beatty & Ritter, 1986); older entities (Ritter, 1984); entities with higher offer
prices (Chalk & Peavy, 1987); IPOs that engage higher-quality underwriters (Carter
& Manaster, 1990); IPOs that engage higher-quality auditors (Beatty, 1989); and
entities with high earnings potential (Koop & Li, 2001).
2.2 Infrastructure literature
Peng and Newell (2007) identify 32 listed infrastructure funds and companies with a
market capitalisation of A$55 billion operating in Australian infrastructure markets at
2006. They point out that the infrastructure entities have contributed the highest
returns to portfolios, as well as having the highest volatility during the third quarter
1995 to the second quarter 2006.
Newell and Peng (2008) argue that, with over US$16 trillion in pension funds
globally, pension funds and institutional investors have more recently considered the
enhanced return and diversification benefit appeal of infrastructure investments. They
confirm that the US infrastructure sector during 2000 to 2006 has shown useful risk-
adjusted performance and portfolio diversification benefits. Newell and Peng (2008)
also forecast that the future demand for infrastructure investments would be strong.
Newell, Chau and Wong (2009) investigate the significance and performance of
infrastructure in China. They suggest that China infrastructure investment has
provided significant and improved risk-adjusted returns but find some recent loss of
diversification benefits in a portfolio. With over US$1.1 trillion in infrastructure since
1996, it appears the Chinese clearly recognise the important link between effective
infrastructure and effective commercial property markets. Newel et al. (2009) identify
this link as important to international investors seeking to add Chinese infrastructure
and property investments to their international portfolios.
Some of the recent professional literature by RREEF Research highlights the
importance of infrastructure investments to investors. In a review of Asian infrastruc-
ture markets, RREEF (2007) points to Japan, China, India, South Korea and Australia
as making available significant infrastructure investment deals. RREEF (2008) reports
institutional investors and pension funds flocking to infrastructure investments
globally attracted to these investments because of their higher yielding, steady cash
flow, inflationary hedge attributes. RREEF (2009) discusses infrastructure funds
targeting renewable energy investments. They expect renewable energy investments
to have a lower correlation with traditional asset classes and to be useful in diversify-
ing investment portfolios.
2.3 Infrastructure IPO literature
There has been little written in the academic literature on infrastructure entity IPOs.
Early work by Dewenter and Field (2001) investigated three infrastructure IPOs in
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Hong Kong during 1996 and 1997 which issued under the so-called ‘relaxed listing
rules’ and compared them with four other infrastructure IPOs issued under the ‘regular
listing rules’. The regular listing rules required IPOs to have a trading record of at least
three years and to have a distributable profit to shareholders of not less than HK$20
million in the most recent year and an aggregate of HK$30 million in the preceding
two years. The relaxed rules for infrastructure entities allowed firms to issue an IPO
without the history or profit requirements. Although first-day returns were reported as
ranging from a negative 18.7% first-day return to a positive 51.1% with no significant
difference detected between the listing types, the sample size was regrettably rather
small. Dewenter and Field (2001) note, however, that these seven infrastructure firms
were all taken public by reputable investment banks.
A recent paper by Yong (2007) examines the current state of IPO research. In
discussing unresolved issues in IPO research, he simply points to the article by
Dewenter and Field (2001). There appears a clear paucity of research into infrastruc-
ture IPOs.
3 Data and methods
The sample consists of 30 Australian infrastructure fund IPOs that listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange during February 1996 to June 2007. Prospectus data were
collected from the Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database.
This study includes variables identified in previous studies found to be significant
in explaining first-day returns. The explanatory variables to be examined are as follows: 
● the natural logarithm of total capital raised (LNPROCEEDS) or the gross capital
raised (PROCEEDS), whichever better fits a linear specification in the model
(Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter, 1994);
● the market sentiment (MKTSENTI) variable that reflects the change in the all
ordinaries index from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing (Dimovski
& Brooks, 2004);
● the number of days from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing
(TIMETOLIST) (Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1996);
● the direct costs of the issue as a percentage of the proceeds raised (PERTOT-
COST), or the is the total direct costs of the capital raising (TOTCOSMIL),
whichever better fits the linear specification (Beatty & Ritter, 1986);
● a (0 or 1) dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issue is underwritten (UWRIT-
TEN) (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Dimovski & Brooks, 2004);
● the dividend yield (DIVYLD) forecasted for the forthcoming full year
(Dimovski & Brooks, 2006).
Two ordinary least squares regression models are run. The first model uses the first-
day return (RETURN) as the dependent variable. The first-day return is the closing
price of the shares on the first day of listing, less the issue price, divided by the issue
price. The second model uses money left on the table (MONEYLEFT) as the depen-
dent variable and is the difference in the closing price of the shares on the first day of
listing less the public issue price, multiplied by the number of shares sold (Loughran
& Ritter, 2002). The closing prices were obtained from the FinAnalysis database.
The regression model with the level of underpricing return as the dependent
variable is: 
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The regression model with money left on the table as the dependent variable is: 
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β’s are unknown parameters to
be estimated and ε is assumed ∼ N (0, σ2).
All of the independent variables have been found to be significant in previous empir-
ical industrial company underpricing studies. The size of the capital raising (LNPROC-
EEDS or PROCEEDS) is expected to have a negative coefficient (Michaely & Shaw,
1994; Ibbotson et al., 1994). The MKTSENTI variable is expected to have a positive
coefficient, and tests whether the more positive (negative) the mood of the stock market,
the more (the less) the price that is paid for shares on the first day of listing (Dimovski
& Brooks, 2004). The TIMETOLIST variable tests the winner’s curse hypothesis in
that more informed investors more quickly subscribe to fill the IPO (Lee et al., 1996).
The PERTOTCOST or TOTCOSTMIL variables are expected to have positive
coefficients in that more uncertain IPOs are likely to have higher direct costs (Beatty
& Ritter, 1986) and higher underpricing. The UWRITTEN variable is expected to
have a negative coefficient (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Dimovski & Brooks, 2004).
While Australian IPOs do not need to be underwritten, the amount of capital raised by
most of the infrastructure firms was so large that high-profile underwriters were used.
The reputation of these underwriters suggests lower uncertainty about their value. The
DIVYLD variable is expected to have a positive coefficient (Dimovski & Brooks,
2004). Infrastructure IPOs offering large dividend yields are likely to be more risky.
4 Results
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the 30 infrastructure fund IPOs. The mean
first-day return was 3.5% while the median was 0.3%. The first-day return is not
statistically significantly different to zero. One IPO was underpriced by 35%, while
one was overpriced by 12.9%. The standard deviation of returns was 10.4%. The mean
average capital raising by these IPOs was $350.4 million, with the smallest being
$3.5 million to the largest being $1.635 billion. The mean aggregate amount of money
left on the table for subscribing investors was $3.7 million, while the median was only
$75,000. The average money left is also not statistically significantly different to zero.
One entity left $105 million on the table for subscribers, while one actually took
$112.8 million more than the entity was worth at the end of the first day.
The average time taken for the IPOs to list from the date of the prospectus was
around 41 days. The range was from 26 days to 91 days. The all ordinaries index
(described as the market sentiment) from prospectus date to the date of listing ranged
from a decrease of 8.5% to an increase of 6% during the listing period. The average
listing cost was around 5.2% of proceeds raised. Two entities had their total capital
raising fees paid by the existing owner that sought to list the entity, while the smallest
capital raiser had direct capital raising costs of 11.4%. Around 87% of the IPOs used
RETURN LNPROCEEDS IMKTSENTI TIMETOLIST
PERTOTCOST UWRITTEN DIVYLD
= + + +
+ + + +
β β β β
β β β ε
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 1( )
MONEYLEFT PROCEEDS IMKTSENTI TIMETOLIST
TOTCOSTMIL UWRITTEN DIVYLD
= + + +
+ + + +
β β β β
β β β ε
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 2( )
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underwriters to guarantee the success of the capital raising. This is not surprising
given the amounts of capital sought. The forecast dividend yields for the next forth-
coming full year ranged from 0% to 11.8%, with a mean of 6.87%.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the ordinary least squares multiple regression results
between the first-day returns and the previously discussed explanatory variables for
the 30 infrastructure fund IPOs. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results for the 26 under-
written infrastructure IPOs and then 25 such IPOs, when one outlier is removed. The
model is rerun with these 26 and 25 IPOs using fewer explanatory variables. Standard
regression diagnostics were calculated and reported. R-squared and adjusted R-squared
results are also reported, and are broadly in line with previous IPO research. In testing
for heteroscedasticity, a White test is applied and White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent coefficients and p-values are reported if appropriate. There is one outlier in
the first-day return analysis that is over 3.0 standard deviations from the mean first-
day return. This econometric methodology is consistent with previous underpricing
studies, including Wang et al. (1992), Ling and Ryngaert (1997), Dimovski and Brooks
(2006), Dimovski (2010), and scientifically and rigorously seeks to explore factors that
influence the level of underpricing. The econometric software Eviews is used.
The results in Panel A with the whole sample of 30 IPOs (and 29 IPOs excluding
the outlier) using six explanatory variables do not disclose any significant explanatory
variables. Panel B, however, is more revealing for the infrastructure fund IPOs that
were underwritten. The results suggest that the DIVYLD variable is significant at better
than the 5% level and positively related to the underpricing return of these IPOs. This
suggests that the underwritten infrastructure IPOs that forecast higher dividend yields
in the forthcoming year have a higher uncertainty about their issue price and as such
offer a higher return to subscribing investors. This is consistent with expectations.
Using the sample of underwritten observations and fewer explanatory variables, the
PERTOTCOST variable also declares itself significant at better than the 5% level and
is positively related. This suggests that underwritten infrastructure fund IPOs, which
pay more in direct costs to raise their equity capital, are also seen to have more uncer-
tainty about their value and offer higher first-day returns to subscribers. These higher
direct issue costs appear to be influential in the higher indirect cost of underpricing also.
Table 3 shows the ordinary least squares multiple regression results between the
money left by infrastructure fund IPO issuers and the previously discussed explanatory
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Australian infrastructure fund IPOs.
Mean Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
First-day return 0.035 0.003 0.104 −0.129 0.350
Money left ($m) 3.696 0.075 45.623 −112.790 105.000
Gross proceeds ($m) 350.355 287.350 364.416 3.500 1635.000
Market sentiment −0.006 −0.003 0.034 −0.085 0.060
Time to list (days) 40.967 38.000 15.289 26.000 91.000
Total cost ($m) 14.103 12.000 16.808 0.000 70.800
Total cost as a percentage of 
proceeds
0.052 0.047 0.026 0.000 0.114
Underwritten 0.867 1.000 0.346 0.000 1.000
Forecast dividend yield (%) 6.865 8.150 4.091 0.000 11.800
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
5:
39
 9
 M
ay
 2
01
1
10  W. Dimovski
Ta
bl
e 
2.
Fi
rs
t-
da
y 
re
tu
rn
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
re
su
lt
s.
N
o.
 o
f 
ob
s.
C
L
n
pr
oc
ee
ds
M
kt
S
en
ti
T
im
et
ol
is
t
P
er
to
tc
os
t
U
w
ri
tt
en
D
iv
yl
d
R
2
A
dj
. R
2
Ja
rq
ue
–
B
er
a
W
hi
te
 
te
st
R
es
et
 
te
st
P
an
el
 A
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 r
et
ur
n
30
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
0.
08
4
(0
.6
49
)
−
0.
00
7
(0
.7
59
)
−
0.
25
5
(0
.7
19
)
0.
00
2
(0
.4
03
)
0.
72
4
(0
.5
09
)
0.
02
2
(0
.8
06
)
0.
00
6
(0
.3
72
)
0.
11
0
−
0.
13
3
10
.7
11
(0
.0
05
)
27
.2
98
(0
.2
91
)
−
6.
87
8
(0
.6
82
)
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 r
et
ur
n
E
xc
lu
di
ng
 o
ut
li
er
s
29
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
0.
01
6
(0
.9
14
)
−
0.
00
9
(0
.6
51
)
−
0.
10
2
(0
.8
59
)
−
0.
00
1
(0
.8
18
)
1.
07
1
(0
.2
35
)
−
0.
03
5
(0
.6
32
)
0.
00
7
(0
.1
87
)
0.
19
1
−
0.
03
0
4.
53
8
(0
.1
03
)
25
.4
11
(0
.3
84
)
−
12
.4
49
(0
.3
43
)
P
an
el
 B
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 r
et
ur
n
A
ll
 U
nd
er
w
ri
tt
en
26
C
oe
f.
 
pV
al
ue
−
0.
25
3
(0
.2
43
)
−
0.
19
1
(0
.4
21
)
−
0.
70
6
(0
.3
71
)
0.
00
6
(0
.0
53
)*
0.
83
9
(0
.4
50
)
– –
0.
01
8
(0
.0
44
)*
*
0.
26
6
0.
08
2
4.
34
6
(0
.1
14
)
24
.4
45
(0
.2
24
)
0.
58
5
(0
.9
35
)
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 r
et
ur
n
A
ll
 U
nd
er
w
ri
tt
en
 
E
xc
lu
di
ng
 o
ut
li
er
s
25
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
0.
18
6
(0
.2
87
)
−
0.
01
8
(0
.3
43
)
−
0.
73
60
(0
.5
73
)
0.
00
3
(0
.1
81
)
1.
27
0
(0
.1
67
)
– –
0.
01
6
(0
.0
29
)*
*
0.
35
0
0.
17
9
1.
60
7
(0
.4
48
)
22
.3
39
(0
.3
22
)
4.
06
3
(0
.5
50
)
F
ew
er
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
∧
26
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
0.
32
7
(0
.0
13
)
– –
– –
0.
00
4
(0
.1
3)
1.
52
6
(0
.0
22
)*
*
– –
0.
01
4
(0
.0
24
)*
*
0.
21
3
0.
10
6
5.
26
4
(0
.0
72
)
18
.7
16
(0
.0
28
)
−
1.
68
8
(0
.8
30
)
F
ew
er
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
nd
E
xc
lu
di
ng
 o
ut
li
er
s
25
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
0.
27
1
(0
.0
43
)
– –
– –
0.
00
3
(0
.2
18
)
1.
80
0
(0
.0
22
)*
*
– –
0.
12
7
(0
.0
44
)*
*
0.
30
8
0.
21
0
1.
88
6
(0
.3
89
)
11
.2
28
(0
.2
60
)
1.
60
6
(0
.7
71
)
N
ot
e:
 T
ab
le
 2
 s
ho
w
s 
th
e 
or
di
na
ry
 l
ea
st
 s
qu
ar
es
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
re
su
lt
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
IP
O
s 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
th
at
 w
er
e 
un
de
rw
ri
tt
en
. 
O
ut
li
er
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n
ex
cl
ud
ed
 a
nd
 f
ew
er
 e
xp
la
na
to
ry
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
w
he
re
 s
ho
w
n.
 T
he
 R
2 ,
 a
dj
us
te
d 
R
2 ,
 J
ar
qu
e 
B
er
a,
 W
hi
te
 a
nd
 R
am
se
y 
R
es
et
 t
es
t 
st
at
is
ti
cs
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
sh
ow
n.
 T
he
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
an
d
p-
va
lu
es
 (
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
) 
ar
e 
re
po
rt
ed
. ∧
 W
hi
te
 (
19
80
) 
co
rr
ec
te
d 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 s
ho
w
n.
 *
*,
 *
 s
ho
w
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
5%
 a
nd
 1
0%
 l
ev
el
s 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
5:
39
 9
 M
ay
 2
01
1
Journal of Property Research 11
Ta
bl
e 
3.
Fi
rs
t-
da
y 
m
on
ey
 l
ef
t 
re
gr
es
si
on
 r
es
ul
ts
.
N
o.
 o
f 
ob
s.
C
P
ro
ce
ed
s
M
kt
S
en
ti
T
im
et
ol
is
t
T
ot
co
sm
il
U
w
ri
tt
en
D
iv
yl
d
R
2
A
dj
. R
2
Ja
rq
ue
–
B
er
a
W
hi
te
 
T
es
t
R
es
et
 
T
es
t
P
an
el
 A
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 m
on
ey
 l
ef
t
30
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
3.
41
9
(0
.9
42
)
−
0.
11
6
(0
.0
30
)*
*
24
.4
26
(0
.9
21
)
0.
12
3
(0
.8
46
)
1.
07
1
(0
.3
51
)
7.
74
7
(0
.7
81
)
2.
63
9
(0
.2
26
)
0.
37
6
0.
21
3
10
.4
36
(0
.0
05
)
27
.8
86
(0
.2
65
)
−
0.
01
6
(0
.0
65
)
P
an
el
 B
F
ir
st
-d
ay
 m
on
ey
 l
ef
t
A
ll
 u
nd
er
w
ri
tt
en
26
C
oe
f.
 
pV
al
ue
−
66
.9
67
(0
.2
65
)
−
0.
11
0
(0
.0
45
)*
*
−
14
0.
23
0
(0
.6
26
)
1.
34
3
(0
.2
12
)
0.
98
1
(0
.4
00
)
– –
5.
80
7
(0
.0
63
)*
0.
44
6
0.
30
8
5.
38
9
(0
.0
68
)
24
.6
62
(0
.2
15
)
−
0.
01
3
(0
.1
43
)
F
ew
er
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
26
C
oe
f.
pV
al
ue
−
54
.0
86
(0
.3
04
)
−
0.
11
8
(0
.0
22
)*
*
– –
1.
11
9
(0
.2
38
)
1.
14
0
(0
.3
01
)
– –
5.
29
2
(0
.0
64
)*
0.
43
9
0.
33
3
4.
64
6
(0
.0
98
)
18
.7
48
(0
.1
75
)
−
0.
01
0
(0
.1
85
)
N
ot
e:
 T
ab
le
 3
 s
ho
w
s 
th
e 
or
di
na
ry
 l
ea
st
 s
qu
ar
es
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
re
su
lt
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
IP
O
s 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
th
at
 w
er
e 
un
de
rw
ri
tt
en
. 
Fe
w
er
 e
xp
la
na
to
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s 
w
er
e 
us
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
la
st
 r
ow
. T
he
 R
2 ,
 a
dj
us
te
d 
R
2 ,
 J
ar
qu
e 
B
er
a,
 W
hi
te
 a
nd
 R
am
se
y 
R
es
et
 t
es
t 
st
at
is
ti
cs
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
sh
ow
n.
 T
he
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
an
d 
p-
va
lu
es
 (
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
)
ar
e 
re
po
rt
ed
. *
*,
 *
 s
ho
w
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
5%
 a
nd
 1
0%
 l
ev
el
s 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
5:
39
 9
 M
ay
 2
01
1
12  W. Dimovski
variables. There are no outlier observations in the money left analysis that are over 3.0
standard deviations from the mean money left. Standard regression diagnostics were
again calculated and reported.
The results of the regression analysis using money left as the dependent variable
suggest there is a negative relationship between the aggregate amount of money left
and the gross proceeds raised (PROCEEDS) for the whole sample in Panel A, the
underwritten partition and the underwritten partition using fewer explanatory vari-
ables in Panel B. This suggests that larger infrastructure fund IPO capital raisers leave
less money on the table for subscribing investors. As such, they appear to price these
larger issues more accurately. This is an interesting result – these infrastructure IPOs
raised substantial capital from the public indeed (median proceeds of A$287 million)
while leaving little to subscribing investors on the first day (median money left of
A$75,000) and it appears that those infrastructure IPOs that raise more, leave less on
the table in aggregate to subscribers. This result is consistent with the stable cash
flows and high barriers to entry discussion in Peng and Newell (2007).
5 Conclusion
This study adds to literature on infrastructure entity IPOs with an examination of such
IPOs in Australia during 1996 to 2007. This is the first reported study specifically on
the underpricing of infrastructure IPOs and identifies that these IPOs do not display
significant first-day return or significant money left on the table characteristics. This
suggests that there is not a great deal of uncertainty about their valuation and is consis-
tent with the more predictable earning and cash flow, captive customer base, high
operating margin and other near monopoly characteristics described in Peng and
Newell (2007) and Newell et al. (2009). This also suggests that these infrastructure
entity IPOs having less uncertainty about their future cash flows are vastly less risky
than industrial and mining company IPOs, and even slightly less risky than US REIT
and A-REIT IPOs. It is also worth noting that highly ranked investment banks are
most often used in the pricing of these infrastructure issues.
Even though there does not appear to be significant underpricing, on average,
among Australian infrastructure IPOs, some variables that influence first-day returns
and money left are identified in this study. Among those IPOs that are underwritten,
it appears that those that offered higher dividend yields offered higher first-day
returns to subscribers. It appears those infrastructure IPOs needing to offer higher
dividends signal a degree of higher risk about their value. There is also some
evidence that higher percentage direct costs of capital raising influence these first-day
returns. This suggests that the direct costs of equity capital raising signal a higher
degree of risk about the value of the infrastructure IPO, and in turn influence the indi-
rect costs of the equity capital raised by the infrastructure entity. There is also
compelling evidence to suggest that larger infrastructure IPOs leave less money to
subscribers in aggregate terms. This empirical evidence clearly supports the monop-
oly characteristic discussion in Peng and Newell (2007) and Newell et al. (2009).
Given the substantial amounts of new equity capital raised and the fees that can be
made by investment bankers from such large raisings, it is likely that these bankers
work particularly hard on an appropriate valuation. It is worth noting that these
results are for a useable sample of infrastructure IPOs prior to the recent global finan-
cial crisis. It will be interesting to study infrastructure IPOs after the global financial
crisis.
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